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Abstract
This work attempts to address adversarial robustness of deep networks by means of
novel learning arguments. Specifically, inspired from results in neuroscience, we
propose a local competition principle as a means of adversarially-robust deep learn-
ing. We argue that novel local winner-takes-all (LWTA) nonlinearities, combined
with posterior sampling schemes, can greatly improve the adversarial robustness of
traditional deep networks against difficult adversarial attack schemes. We combine
these LWTA arguments with tools from the field of Bayesian non-parametrics,
specifically the stick-breaking construction of the Indian Buffet Process, to flexibly
account for the inherent uncertainty in data-driven modeling. As we experimentally
show, the new proposed model achieves high robustness to adversarial perturbations
on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. Our model achieves state-of-the-art results in
powerful white-box attacks, while at the same time retaining its benign accuracy
to a high degree. Equally importantly, our approach achieves this result while
requiring far less trainable model parameters than the existing state-of-the-art.
1 Introduction
In recent years, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have provided a variety of breakthroughs in numerous
applications, especially in the Computer Vision Community, e.g., [18, 42, 3]. However, it is a well-
known fact, that DNNs are highly susceptible to adversarial attacks. In the adversarial context,
adversarial examples, i.e., inputs comprising carefully design perturbations, aim to “fool” the
considered model into misclassification. Even small perturbations in the original input, e.g. an Lp
norm, can successfully render the model vulnerable, highlighting the frailness of the commonly
employed DNN approaches in more demanding tasks [35]. It is apparent, that this vulnerability,
restricts their safe and confident employment in safety-critical applications, such as, autonomous
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driving [4, 8, 27], video recognition [21], healthcare [13] and other real-world scenarios [27]. To
this end, significant research effort has been devoted in the Deep Learning community, in order to
defend against various kinds of attacks, aspiring to make DNNs more robust to adversarial examples.
Several approaches have been proposed to successfully tackle this task; however, each comes with its
own disadvantages.
Adversarial attacks, as well as defense strategies, comprise many different approaches, sharing the
same goal; making deep architectures more reliable and robust. In general, the adversarial defenses
can be categorized as: (i) Adversarial Training, where a model is trained both with the original, as
well as perturbed data, aspiring to make the model more robust during inference [32, 45, 38], (ii)
Manifold Projections, where the original data are projected into a different subspace presuming that
therein, the effects of the perturbations can be mitigated [19, 37, 39] (iii) Stochasticity, where some
randomization of the input data and/or of the neuronal activations of each hidden layer is performed
[36, 9, 47], and (iv) Preprocessing, where some aspect of either the data or of the neuronal activations
are modified or transformed [5, 17, 22].
However, many of the currently considered approaches and architectures are particularly tailored
to tackle a specific attack, restricting their generality to other potential adversarial schemes; thus,
it is quite often the case that when the adversarial attack patterns change, the considered models
fail completely. In this context, even though the commonly employed non-linearities, such as the
Rectified Linear Units (ReLUs), provide a flexible computational tool for efficient training of DNNs,
they do not exhibit any useful properties that may address the adversarial scenario; to overcome this
deficiency of common neuronal activations, we may need to consider a radically different approach.
Recently, there is a new invigorated interest in DL community in the creation of more biologically
plausible models. Indeed, there is an increasing body of evidence in the neuroscience community,
that neurons in a biological system with similar functions, are aggregated together in groups and
local competition takes place for their activations. Thus, in each block only one neuron can be active
at a given time, while the rest are inhibited to silence [23, 1, 11, 41, 10, 28], leading to a Local-
Winner-Takes-All (LWTA) mechanism. Employing this mechanism to neural networks has been
shown to provide promising results, introducing the ability to discover effective sparsely distributed
representation of their inputs [30, 33], while exhibiting automatic gain control, noise suppression and
robustness to catastrophic forgetting [40, 16, 6]. These inherent properties of the competition-based
mechanism, render LWTAs a potentially powerful biologically-inspired approach in the adversarial
framework.
On the other hand, the inevitable overfitting tendencies of DNNs render them brittle against adversarial
attacks; even small perturbations of the input data may easily fool an overfitted model. To this end,
significant research effort has been devoted in attacking overfitting, aiming to develop methods
in order to account for the uncertainty of the considered architectures. Thus, many regularization
methods have been proposed in the literature, e.g., Dropout [14]. In this context, Chatzis [7] presented
a novel approach, relying on the sparsity-inducing nonparametric Indian Buffet Process Prior (IBP)
[15] in order to regularize the resulting architecture in a data-driven fashion. Using a set of auxiliary
Bernoulli random variables, the utility of each architectural component was explicitly modeled, in an
on-off fashion, intelligently inferring the necessary network complexity to represent the data. These
approaches act as a source of inspiration for effectively addressing the adversarial scenario. We
posit that the robustness of the model against adversarial examples may significantly increase, by
accounting for the modeling uncertainty, while at the same time exploiting the benefits of the induced
regularization.
Drawing upon these insights, we propose a new deep network design scheme that is particularly
tailored to address the adversarial context. This capacity is effectuated via the combination of the
LWTA mechanism and the nonparametric Bayesian IBP prior, allowing for potently addressing
uncertainty. Moreover, we combine our proposed paradigm with Error Correcting Output Codes [46].
We evaluate our approach using well-known benchmark datasets and architectures. The provided
empirical evidence vouch for the potency of our approach, yielding state-of-the-art robustness against
powerful white-box-attacks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the necessary
theoretical background. In Section 3, we introduce the proposed approach and describe its integrated
IBP and competition-based mechanisms. In Section 4 we perform extensive experimental evaluations,
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providing insights for the behavior of the produced model, while in Section 5, we summarize the
contribution of this work, and discuss potential future directions.
2 Theoretical Background
In the following, we briefly present both the two core components utilized in this work, namely the
nonparametric Indian Buffet Process Prior and the Local Winner-Takes-All mechanism.
2.1 Indian Buffet Process
The Indian Buffet Process (IBP) [15] defines a probability distribution over infinite binary matrices.
IBP can be used as a flexible prior, allowing the number of considered features to be unbounded and
inferred in a data-driven fashion. Its construction, ensures sparsity in the obtained representation,
while at the same time allowing for more features to emerge, as new observations appear. Here, we
focus on the stick-breaking construction of the IBP proposed by [43], making the IBP amenable to
Variational Inference. Let us consider N observations, and a binary matrix Z = [zi,k]
N,K
i,k=1; each
entry therein, indicates the existence of feature k in observation i. Taking the infinite limit K →∞,
we can construct the following hierarchical representation [43]:
uk ∼ Beta(α, 1) pik =
k∏
i=1
ui zi,k ∼ Bernoulli(pik)∀i (1)
where α is non-negative parameter, called the strength or innovation parameter, and controls the
induced sparsity. In practice,K is set to be equal to the input dimensionality to avoid the overcomplete
feature representation when K →∞.
2.2 Local Winner-Takes-All
Even though the commonly employed activations, such as ReLUs, constitute a convenient mathe-
matical tool for training deep neural networks, they do not come with biological plausibility. In the
following, we describe the general architecture when locally competing units are employed via the
Local Winner-Takes-All (LWTA) mechanism.
Let us assume a single layer of an LWTA-based network comprising K LWTA blocks with U
competing units therein. Each block produces an output yk, k = 1, . . . ,K given some input
x ∈ RN×J . Each linear unit in each block, computes its activation huk , u = 1, . . . U , and the output
of the each block is decided via competition. Thus, for each block k and unit u therein, the output
reads:
yuk = g(h
1
k, . . . , h
U
k ) (2)
where g(·) is the competition function. The activation of each individual neuron follows the conven-
tional inner product computation huk = w
T
kux, where W ∈ RJ×K×U is the weight matrix in this
context. In the rigid LWTA network definition, the final output reads:
yuk =
{
1, if huk ≥ hik, ∀i = 1, . . . , U, i 6= u
0, otherwise
(3)
To bypass the restrictive binary output, more expressive versions of the competition function have
been proposed in the literature, e.g., [40]:
yuk =
{
huk , if h
u
k ≥ hik, ∀i = 1, . . . , U, i 6= u
0, otherwise
(4)
It is apparent that, only the neuron with the strongest activation produces an output in each block,
while the others are inhibited to silence, i.e., the zero value. In this way, the output of each layer of
the network yields a sparse representation according to the competition outcome within each block.
Both these competition functions are called the hard winner-takes-all function; in case of multiple
winners the tie can be broken either by index or randomly. Panousis et al. [34], proposed a novel
competition function, based on a competitive random sampling procedure, driven by the activations
of each neuron in each block. In our work, we adopt the latter, explained in detail in the following.
3
3 Model Definition
In this work, we consider a principled way of designing deep neural networks that are particularly
tailored to handle adversarial attacks. To this end, we combine the LWTA approach with appropriate
arguments from the nonparametric Bayesian statistics. We aim to provide a more robust approach
towards adversarial examples by flexibly accounting for the modeling uncertainty.
Let us assume an input dataset X ∈ RN×J with N examples, comprising J features each. In
conventional deep architectures, each hidden layer comprises nonlinear units; the input is presented
to the layer, which then computes an affine transformation via the inner product of the input with
weightsW ∈ RJ×K , producing outputs Y ∈ RN×K . The described computation for each example
n yields yn = σ(xnW + b) ∈ RK , n = 1, . . . , N , where b ∈ RK is a bias factor and σ(·) is a
non-linear activation function, e.g. ReLU. An architecture comprises intermediate and output layers.
We begin with the definition of an intermediate layer of our approach.
In the LWTA setting, the aforementioned procedure is modified; singular units are replaced by LWTA
blocks, each containing a set of competing units. Thus, the layer input is now presented to each
different block and each unit therein, via different weights. Assuming K number of LWTA blocks
and U number of competing units, the weights are now represented via a three-dimensional matrix
W ∈ RJ×K×U .
As previously mentioned, we follow [34], where the local competition in each block is performed via
a competitive random sampling procedure. Specifically, we define additional discrete latent vectors
ξn ∈ one_hot(U)K , in order to encode the outcome of the local competition between the units
in each block. For each datapoint n, the non-zero entry of the one-hot representation, denotes the
winning unit among the U competitors in each of the K blocks of the layer.
To further account for the uncertainty and regularization of the resulting model, we turn to the nonpara-
metric Bayesian framework. Specifically, we introduce a matrix of latent variables Z ∈ {0, 1}J×K ,
to explicitly regularize the model by inferring the utility of each synaptic weight connection in each
layer. Each entry therein is set to one, if the jth dimension of the input is presented to the kth
block, otherwise zj,k = 0. We impose the sparsity-inducing IBP prior over the latent variables Z and
perform inference over them.
We can now define the output of a layer of the considered model, yn ∈ RK·U , as follows:
[yn]ku = [ξn]ku
J∑
j=1
(wj,k,u · zj,k) · [xn]j ∈ R (5)
In order to facilitate a competitive random sampling procedure in a data-driven fashion, the latent
indicators ξn are drawn from a posterior Categorical distribution that reads:
q([ξn]k) = Discrete
[ξn]k∣∣∣softmax
 J∑
j=1
[wj,k,u]
U
u=1 · zj,k · [xn]j
 (6)
The posteriors of the latent variables Z are drawn from Bernoulli posteriors, such that:
q(zj,k) = Bernoulli(zj,k|p˜ij,k) (7)
Consequently, we impose a symmetric Discrete prior over the latent indicators, [ξn]k ∼
Discrete(1/U), while we resort to fixed-point estimation for the weight matrices W . The defi-
nition of an intermediate layer of the considered approach is now complete.
For the output layer of our approach, we consider a similar variant based on the conventional
feedforward layer. That is, we perform the standard inner product computation, while utilizing the
IBP to further account for model uncertainty.
Specifically, we assume an input x ∈ RN×J to a C-unit output layer with weights W ∈ RJ×C . We
introduce an analogous auxiliary matrix of latent variables Z ∈ {0, 1}J×C . Thus, the computation
for the output y ∈ RN×C yields:
yn,c =
J∑
j=1
(wj,c · zj,c) · [xn]j ∈ R (8)
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Figure 1: (a) A graphical representation of a competition-based architecture. Rectangles denote
LWTA blocks and circles the competing units therein. The winner units are denoted with bold
contours (ξ = 1). Bold edges in the last layer, denote retained connections (z = 1). (b) The
convolutional LWTA variant. Competition takes places among feature maps. The winner feature map
(denoted with bold contour) passes its output to the next layer, while the rest are zeroed out.
where the posterior latent variable Z are drawn independently from a Bernoulli distribution:
q (zj,c) = Bernoulli (zj,c|p˜ij,c) (9)
The prior for Z, once again follows the SBP of the IBP, while we seek fix-point estimates for the
weights. The formulation of the full network architecture is now complete. A graphical illustration of
the proposed approach is depicted in Fig. 1a.
3.1 Convolutional Layers
In order to accommodate architectures comprising convolutional operations, we adopt the LWTA
convolutional variant as defined in [34]. Specifically, let us assume an input tensor {X}Nn=1 ∈
RH×L×C at a specific layer, where H,L,C are the height, length and channels of the input. We
define a set of kernels, each with weightsW k ∈ Rh×l×C×U , where h, l, C, U are the kernel height,
length, number of channels and competing features maps, and k = 1, . . .K. Thus, analogously to the
grouping of linear units in the dense layers, in this case, local competition is performed among feature
maps. Each kernel is treated as an LWTA block and each layer comprises multiple kernels competing
for their outputs. We additionally consider an analogous auxiliary binary matrix Z ∈ {0, 1}K to
further regularize the convolutional layers.
Thus, at a given layer of the corresponding convolutional variant, the output Y n ∈ RH×L×K·U is
obtained via concatenation along the last dimension of the subtensors:
[Y n]k = [ξn]k ((zk ·Wk) ?Xn) ∈ H × L× U (10)
whereXn is the input tensor for the nth datapoint, “?” denotes the convolution operation and [ξn]k ∈
one_hot(U) is a one-hot vector representation with U components. Turning to the competition
function, we follow the same rationale, such that the sampling procedure is driven from the outputs
of the competing feature maps:
q([ξn]k) = Discrete([ξn]k
∣∣∣softmax(∑
h′,l′
[(zk ·Wk) ?Xn]h′,l′,u) (11)
We impose an IBP prior on Z, while the posteriors are drawn from a Bernoulli distribution, such that,
q(zk) = Bernoulli(zk|p˜ik). We impose an analogous symmetric prior for the latent winner indicators
[ξn]k ∼ Discrete(1/U). A graphical illustration of the defined layer is depicted in Fig. 1b.
3.2 Training & Inference
To train the proposed model, we resort to maximization of the Evidence Lower Bound (ELBO).
To facilitate efficiency in the resulting procedures, we adopt the Stochastic Gradient Variational
Bayes framework (SGVB) [24]. However, our model comprises latent variables that are not readily
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amenable to the reparameterization trick of SGVB, namely, the discrete latent variables Z and ξ, and
the Beta-distributed stick variables u. To this end, we utilize the continuous relaxation based on the
Gumbel-Softmax trick [31, 20] for the discrete random variables and the Kumarawamy distribution
[26] as an approximation to the Beta distribution. These approximations are only employed during
training. At inference, we draw samples from the respective original distribution of the latent variables,
i.e. the Discrete, Bernoulli and Beta distributions. We employ the mean-field assumption to facilitate
efficient optimization.
Differently than similar approaches, the uncertainty modeling of our approach is based on two
different sampling processes. On the one hand, contrary to the rigid competition function in the
context of competition-based networks presented in [40], we implement a data-driven random
sampling procedure to determine the winning units. On the other, we further account for the
uncertainty of the learning process by sampling from a Bernoulli latent variable based on an IBP
prior. Through the introduced latent variables, we can regularize the model by exploiting the sparsity
inducing behavior of the IBP prior and the overall induced regularization via the maximization of the
resulting ELBO.
4 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate the capacity of our proposed approach against various adversarial attacks and under
different setups. We follow the experimental framework as in [46]. To this end, we employ a modified
decoding error-correcting output code strategy to the output of the proposed network, as described
therein, and we examine the resulting modeling capabilities of an LWTA and IBP based DNN, both
in classification accuracy, as well as in the classification confidence levels.
4.1 Implementation Details
Let us denote by C an M × N coding matrix, where M is the number of classes and N is the
codeword length. Therein, the kth row, denotes the desired output of the network, when the input
is from class k; in this work, we consider only cases with N =M or N > M . We employ coding
matrices of varying length and explore multiple ways of transforming the logits of the last layer of the
network to probabilities, including the Softmax, the Logistic, and the Hyperbolic Tangent Function.
Both standard and ensemble architectures are considered [46]. We resort to SGVB for training the
model, utilizing the Kumaraswamy ([26]) and continuous relaxation of the Discrete distribution
proposed in [20, 31].
4.2 Experimental Setup
We consider two popular benchmark datasets for adversarial research, namely, MNIST [29] and
CIFAR10 [25]. We employ the same architectures, as in [46], employing both Standard and Ensemble
architectures. We consider two different splits for our approach: (i) an architecture comprising
LWTA blocks with 2 competing units, and (ii) one with 4 competing units. In the case of ensemble
architectures containing layers with less than 4 overall units, we employ a hybrid of our approach using
both 2 and 4 way splits. We examine 5 different kinds of adversarial attacks: (i) Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD), (ii) Carlini and Wagner (CW), (iii) Blind Spot Attack (BSA) ([48]), (iv) a random
attack (Rand) [46], and (v) an attack comprising additive uniform noise corruption (+U(−1, 1)). See
the Supplementary Material for the detailed implementation details and experimental setup.
4.3 Experimental Results
In the following, we present the comparative experimental evaluations of our approach. In the pro-
vided tables, we select a subset of four different models (as defined in [46]) employing our proposed
approach, which we compare with the Madry model [32] and the best-performing TanhEns16 and
TanhEns64 models of [46], in order to unclutter the presentation of the experimental results. Detailed
presentation of all the considered models and methods is included in the Supplementary.
MNIST. For the MNIST dataset, we train the network for a maximum of 50 epochs, using the same
data augmentation as in [46]. In Table 1, the comparative results for each different architecture and
adversarial attack are depicted. As we observe, our approach yields considerable improvements
6
over the Madry [32] and TanhEns16 [46] architectures in three of the five considered attacks, while
employing architectures with lower computational footprint. The differences in the rest of the
experiments are negligible. For example, consider the Softmax model comprising LWTA blocks with
2 competing units and TanhEns16 model, which requires ≈ 20% more parameters. In the benign
classification accuracy, we observe a 0.004% difference in favor of TanhEns16, while the Softmax
LWTA model exhibits an improvement of 0.055% in the PGD and a significant 15.9% improvement
in the uniform corruption noise attack. The empirical evidence suggest that our approach yields better
performance than the alternatives, even when employing models with less parameters.
Model Params Benign PGD CW BSA Rand +U(−1, 1)
Softmax (U=4) 327,380 0.9613 0.935 0.97 0.95 0.187 0.929
Softmax (U=2) 327,380 0.9908 0.984 0.97 1.0 0.961 0.986
Logistic (U=2) 327,380 0.9749 0.963 0.96 0.96 0.998 0.963
LogEns10 (U=2) 205,190 0.9653 0.946 0.95 0.94 1.0 0.949
Madry [32] 3,274,634 0.9853 0.925 0.84 0.52 0.351 0.15
TanhEns16 [46] 401,168 0.9948 0.929 1.0 1.0 0.988 0.827
Table 1: Accuracy scores for various models and adversarial attacks on the MNIST dataset. All
considered architectures for our approach are the the same as the ones proposed in [46]. Here, we
report the best-performing adaptations.
CIFAR-10. For the CIFAR-10 dataset, we follow an analogous procedure, utilizing the same
architectures and procedures as in [46]. In Table 2, the obtained comparative effectiveness of our
approach is depicted. In this case, the differences in the computational burden are more evident, since
CIFAR-10 requires more involved architectures, considering its inherent complexity both for benign
classification, as well as, for adversarial attacks. As in the previous experiments, we observe that
our method presents significant improvements in three of the considered adversarial attacks, namely
PGD, CW and BSA, utilizing networks with significantly less parameters (even 2 to 4 times) than the
best performing alternative of [46].
Model Params Benign PGD CW BSA Rand +U(−1, 1)
Tanh16(U=4) 773,600 0.5097 0.46 0.55 0.6 0.368 0.436
Softmax(U=2) 772,628 0.8488 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.302 0.825
Tanh16(U=2) 773,600 0.8539 0.826 0.83 0.83 0.32 0.815
LogEns10(U=2) 1,197,998 0.8456 0.846 0.83 0.8 1.0 0.812
Madry [32] 45,901,914 0.871 0.47 0.08 0 0.981 0.856
TanhEns64 [46] 3,259,456 0.896 0.601 0.76 0.76 1.0 0.875
Table 2: Accuracy scores for various models and adversarial attacks on the CIFAR10 dataset. Once
again, we consider all the architectures proposed in [46] and report the best-performing adaptations.
4.4 Further Insights
We scrutinize the behavior of the LWTA mechanism in the performed experimental evaluations, in
order to gain some insights by examining the resulting competition patterns, and assess that the
competition does not collapse to singular “always-winning” units. To this end, we choose a random
intermediate layer of a Tanh16 model comprising 8 or 4 LWTA blocks of 2 and 4 competing units
respectively, and focus on the CIFAR-10 dataset. The probabilities of unit activations for each class
are depicted in Fig. 2. For the former, the probabilities for benign test examples are illustrated in
Fig. 2a, while the corresponding probabilities for the PGD method, are presented in Fig.2b. As we
observe, the unit activation probabilities for each different setup are essentially the same, suggesting
that the LWTA mechanism, succeeds in encoding salient discriminative patterns in the data, while also
exhibiting in practice, the inherent property of noise suppression. The empirical evidence suggest that
we can obtain networks with strong generalization value, able to defend against adversarial attacks in
a principled way. In Fig. 2c and 2d, the corresponding probabilities when employing 4 competing
units are depicted. We observe that in this case, the competition is uncertain about the winning unit
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(a) Benign: U=2 (b) PGD: U=2 (c) Benign: U=4 (d) PGD: U=4
Figure 2: Probabilities of competing units in LWTA blocks, of an intermediate layer of the Tanh16
model, for each class in the CIFAR-10 dataset. Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b, depict the activations of a
model layer with 2 competing units, for benign and PGD test examples respectively. Figs. 2c and
2d correspond to a network layer comprising 4 competing units. Black denotes very high winning
probability, while white denotes very low probability.
in each block and for each class, exhibiting an average activation probability for each unit around
≈ 50%. Moreover, there are several differences in the activations between the benign data and a PGD
attack, explaining the significant drop in performance. This behavior potentially arises due to the
relatively small structure of the network; from the 16 units of the original architecture, only 4 are
active for each input. Thus, in this setting, LWTA fails to encode the necessary distinctive patterns of
the data. Analogous illustrations for different setups are provided in the Supplementary.
Table 3 depicts the inference times for The Softmax model, on various attacks on MNIST datasets.
We compare the Softmax model with our proposed architecture, to the architecture in [46]. We
observe that our proposal, is 4.3 times faster for the execution of PGD attack. For the CW attack it
is 4.35 times faster, while for the Random and the Uniform Noise attack it is 3 times faster.
Model Benign PGD CW BSA Rand +U(−1, 1)
Softmax 7.969 108.219 767.292 823.25 1.370 13.534
Softmax[46] 2.218 48.294 3322.743 3581.75 3.703 40.89
Table 3: Inference times for various attacks for the Softmax model with 2 competing units on the
MNIST dataset.
Finally, we examine the uncertainty estimation capabilities of the introduced approach via the resulting
confidence in the classification task. To this end, and similar to [46], we compare the probability
distributions of class assignment over a randomly chosen set of test examples of the MNIST dataset
for our best performing models with U = 2. Since our approach yields high classification accuracy
in the benign case, we expect that the considered models should exhibit high confidence in label
assignment. Indeed, we observe the expected behavior in Fig. 3a. Fig. 3b, depicts the models
behavior on a PGD attack. We observe that in some cases the models are (correctly) less confident
about the class label due to the adversarial perturbations. However, and contrary to [46, 32], since
our approach retains high classification accuracy, the models assign substantial probability mass
in high confidence levels. The empirical evidence suggests, that by employing a careful blend of
LWTA activations and the IBP, we can overcome the “irrational” overconfidence of the softmax
activation. Softmax incorrectly assigns high confidence to the class with the largest logits, even in
the presence of adversarial examples. Thus, we can overcome this flaw, even when employing small
length error correcting output codes. Fig. 3c illustrates the resulting behavior in randomly generated
inputs. In this case, all models correctly place most of the probability mass in the low spectrum.
The experimental results vouch for the efficacy of our approach, flexibly accounting the inherent
uncertainty in the adversarial context, thus retaining high classification rate against various attacks.
The corresponding graphs for the CIFAR-10 dataset can be found in the Supplementary.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a novel approach towards adversarial robustness in deep networks, aiming
to create networks that exhibit more robust and reliable behavior to white-box adversarial attacks. To
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Figure 3: Probability distributions assigned to the most probable class on the test-set of MNIST by
various models. LEns10 refers to the LogisticEns10 model.
this end, we utilized local competition between linear units, in the form of the Local-Winner-Takes-
All mechanism, combined with the sparsity inducing IBP prior in order to account for the uncertainty
and regularize the learning process. Our experimental evaluations have provided strong empirical
evidence for the efficacy of our approach. The proposed method exhibits considerable improvements
in various kinds of adversarial attacks, while retaining high accuracy in the benign context. It is
noteworthy, that the competition mechanism yielded very similar competition patterns for benign
and adversarial examples, suggesting that the considered approach succeeds in encoding differential
essential sub-distributions of the data through specialization. In our future work, we aim to explore
the potency of the LWTA and IBP integration in other challenging adversarial scenarios.
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